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Abstract: China’s development finance is sizable but reliable information is scarce. To address critical 
information gaps, we introduce a new open source methodology for collecting project-level development 
finance information and create a database of Chinese official finance to Africa from 2000-2011. Our 
initial data collection efforts found that China’s official finance commitments amount to approximately 
US$ 73 billion over the 2000-2011 period. We provide details on 1,511 non-investment projects to 50 
African countries. We use this database to extend previous research on the aid-conflict nexus. Our results 
show that sudden withdrawals of “traditional” aid are only more likely to induce conflict in the absence of 
sufficient alternative funding from China. More broadly, these findings highlight the importance of 
gathering better data on the development activities of China and other non-traditional donors to better 
understand the link between foreign aid and conflict. 
 
Keywords: Development Finance; Foreign Aid; Non-DAC Donors; South-South Cooperation; China; 
Aid Shocks; Violent Armed Conflict 
2	
	
* This article is accompanied by the release of AidData's Chinese Official Finance to Africa Dataset, 
Version 1.1, available for download at http://china.aiddata.org/datasets/1.1 and an interactive database 
platform (at http://china.aiddata.org). AidData’s Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) 
methodology is also available for download at http://china.aiddata.org/TUFF_codebook. An earlier 
version of this article – entitled “China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to 
Data Collection,” co-authored with Vijaya Ramachandran – is available as working paper of the Center 
for Global Development (CGD Working Paper 323). We thank Owen Barder, Deborah Bräutigam, Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita, Chuan Chen, Vivien Foster, Fang He, Cullen Hendrix, Nataliya Pushak, Mona 
Sehgal, Arvind Subramanian, Bann Seng Tan, Yan Wang, Eric Werker, and Franck Wiebe for comments 
on earlier drafts of this paper. We also thank Julie Walz for her contributions to the paper while a Policy 
Analyst at the Center for Global Development. We owe a debt of gratitude to Brian O’Donnell, who 
managed the team of research assistants at the College of William and Mary responsible for the creation 
of AidData's China’s Official Finance to Africa Dataset, Version 1.0, and Robert Mosolgo, who created 
the online coding interface for our research assistants and the interactive database platform at 
http://china.aiddata.org. Wen Chen, Sarah Christophe, Alexandria Foster, Jaclyn Goldschmidt, Dylan 
Kolhoff, Patrick Leisure, Kevin McCrory, Alex Miller, Henrique Passos Neto, Grace Perkins, Charles 
Perla, Kyle Titlow, Wendy Wen, and Amber Will provided outstanding research assistance during the 
project. The authors are solely responsible for any errors or shortcomings in this article. 
3	
	
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, foreign assistance from non-Western governments has increased sharply—both in 
absolute terms and as a share of global development finance (Manning 2006; Woods 2008; Walz and 
Ramachandran 2011; Dreher et al. 2011, 2013; Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013). The emerging “Aid 2.0” 
architecture (The Economist 2011) poses a challenge to the existing aid regime that is organized around 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Increasing donor competition grants developing countries the opportunity to 
“shop around” for the types of development finance that best suit their interests (Dreher et al. 2013). The 
rapid increase in development finance from governments that do not report to the DAC also raises a set of 
vexing questions for scholars and policymakers. How much funding do these non-DAC donors provide, 
to whom and on what terms? What impact do non-DAC sources of finance have on economic 
development, democratization, debt sustainability, environmental outcomes, conflict and violence in 
developing countries? China, Russia, Venezuela, and India are thought to provide billions of dollars in 
assistance every year (Walz and Ramachandran 2011), but most of these “new” suppliers of development 
finance have chosen not to participate in existing reporting systems, such as the OECD’s Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS) or the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).1	
 China is of particular interest to researchers and policymakers because of the perceived scale and 
opaqueness of its activities in developing countries. Western policymakers have accused China of 
expanding its presence in Africa for largely self-interested reasons: securing access to natural resources, 
subsidizing Chinese firms and exports, cementing and expanding political alliances, and pursuing global 
economic hegemony.2 China counters that its investment in Africa “[…] is based on respecting the will of 
Africa, listening to the voice of Africa and caring about the concerns of Africa, thus earning the trust of 
most African countries.”3 With increasing development activities all over the African continent, China’s 
development finance has come under intense scrutiny over the last decade. To analyze recipient 
perceptions, Milner et al. (2013) have conducted a field experiment that included 3,600 participants 
																																																								
1  There are widely varying levels of commitment to transparency among non-DAC suppliers of development 
finance. For example, Brazil, India, South Africa, and many of the new Eastern and Central European donors have 
demonstrated a higher level of interest in data disclosure and compliance with international reporting standards 
(Aufricht et al. 2012; Sinha and Hubbard 2012). Russia has recently started to provide aggregate bilateral aid data to 
the CRS. 
2 See Dreher and Fuchs (2012) for a summary of the relevant literature. 
3  “Is China an irresponsible friend of Africa?” People's Daily Online, 16 August 2006, available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7899133.html. 
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suggesting that in Uganda public opinion about Chinese “aid” projects is worse than opinions about US or 
World Bank aid projects. African policymakers are divided on the issue of whether, to what degree, and 
how Chinese development finance impacts social, economic, environmental, and government outcomes.4 
While some leaders perceive Chinese financing as better suited to Africa’s needs, others feel threatened 
by China’s growing presence in their countries. 5  Adjudicating between these competing claims has 
proven difficult because Beijing discloses very little official information about its development finance 
activities. In the absence of reliable and comprehensive data about Chinese development finance, much of 
the conventional wisdom about Chinese development finance rests on untested assumptions, individual 
case studies, and incomplete data sources.6  
 As a result of this lack of data, scholars cannot account for China’s development activities in 
quantitative studies of the allocation, effectiveness and (unwelcome) side-effects of aid. Since China is 
said to have emerged as the most important non-Western source of development finance, this omission 
may considerably bias research results.  To understand the allocation pattern and consequences of 
development aid and similar activities, scholarship needs to get the whole picture to give reliable answers 
to research questions involving aid and conflict, geopolitical competition, and connections between aid 
shocks and violence. To address these critical information gaps, we (a) systematize a web-based, open 
source methodology for collecting project-level development finance information; and (b) create a 
comprehensive database of Chinese development finance flows to Africa from 2000-2011. We then use 
this database to replicate the findings by Nielsen et al. (2011), who show that aid shocks significantly 
increase the likelihood of conflict onset. Building upon these findings, our new empirical results suggest 
																																																								
4 We discuss this in more detail in a previous version of this paper (Strange et al. 2013). 
5 See, for example, evidence reported in media reports: Wade, Abdoulaye, “Time for the West to Practice What It 
Preaches,” Financial Times, 23 January 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d347f88-c897-11dc-
94a6-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz295bvXrn1; Kagame, Paul, “Why Africa Welcomes the Chinese,” The Guardian, 2 
November 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/aid-trade-rwanda-china-west; 
Conway-Smith, Erin, “Zambian Election Results Check Chinese Influence in Africa,” Global Post, 25 September 
2011, available at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/110924/zambian-election-results-check-
chinese-influence-africa. 
6  The Chinese authorities have taken some modest steps to make their development finance activities more 
transparent in recent years. The State Council’s release of the inaugural “White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid” in 
April 2011 is one of several encouraging developments in this regard (State Council 2011). However, official 
sources do not cover most of Chinese development finance activities; nor do they consistently specify financial 
amounts or forms of support at the project level. 
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that sudden withdrawals of “traditional” aid are only more likely to induce conflict in the absence of 
sufficient alternative funding from China. 
 This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of previous attempts to 
measure Chinese development finance and identifies some of the key factors that have impeded the 
creation of accurate, detailed, and comprehensive data. In Section 3, we introduce our new data collection 
methodology and present the resultant database of Chinese overseas development finance activities. We 
find that China’s financial commitments exceed US$ 73 billion over the 2000-2011 period. Section 4 
provides an overview of Chinese development finance to Africa as tracked by this new database. In 
Section 5, we extend the findings of Nielsen et al. (2011) and show that the collection of Chinese aid data 
is crucial to fully understand the aid-conflict nexus. However, we are cognizant of the limitations imposed 
by this data collection approach and we discuss these weaknesses and conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. QUANTIFYING CHINESE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
The Chinese government does not release detailed, project-level financial information about its overseas 
aid activities.7 The establishment of a comprehensive aid reporting infrastructure is challenging as flows 
come from various ministries. Chinese officials have argued that publishing country-level data will draw 
attention to which countries are the largest recipients and result in pressure from other governments for 
more aid (Lancaster 2007). 8  Moreover, publishing total volumes of Chinese aid may also provoke 
domestic criticism about spending abroad when there are so many Chinese still living in poverty 
(Lancaster 2007). Beijing’s resistance to aid transparency may also reflect a broader disinterest in 
complying with Western (OECD-DAC) standards (Grimm et al. 2011). As a result of this lack of 
transparency, China’s aid to Africa is the subject of much speculation, confusion, and misinformation. 
																																																								
7 The yearbooks of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reported a list of “comprehensive projects completed” 
by recipient country between 1990 and 2005, but do not identify the financial value of these projects (available at 
http://aiddata.org/content/index/Research/research-datasets). Moreover, the World Food Program’s Food Aid 
Information System (FAIS; available at http://www.wfp.org/fais/) and the UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service 
(FTS; available at http://fts.unocha.org/) report information on China’s food aid and humanitarian aid flows, 
respectively. However, these flows constitute only a small fraction of China’s development finance. 
8 While the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance are the primary 
actors, Chinese development finance is administered through a multi-tiered system that includes participation from 
23 government ministries and commissions as well as local, provincial and regional ministries of commerce (Huang 
2007). For example, the Ministry of Social Welfare oversees the implementation of humanitarian aid programs 
(Christensen 2010) and military aid is handled by the Ministry of National Defense (Pehnelt 2007). 
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Scholars, policy analysts, and journalists routinely use inflated estimates to demonstrate the threat that 
China poses to Western donors on the continent. 
Conceptual differences confound efforts to catalogue and measure “Chinese aid.” Chinese 
development finance flows do not easily align with the well-defined OECD-DAC definitions of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF). The DAC defines ODA as “[g]rants or 
loans to [developing] countries and territories […] and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken 
by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) 
at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to 
financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid” (OECD DAC glossary).9 Members of the DAC 
have agreed that assistance to refugees, scholarships for developing country students, and funding 
relevant research are eligible to be included in ODA. Military aid and peacekeeping enforcement are 
examples for flows that are excluded (OECD 2008). OOF is categorized as “[t]ransactions by the official 
sector with [developing] countries […] which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as Official 
Development Assistance, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they 
have a grant element of less than 25 per cent” (OECD DAC glossary). 
 China states that its foreign aid “[f]alls into the category of South-South cooperation” (State 
Council 2011); however, it does not provide precise definitions in the 2011 White Paper or other official 
publications. The White Paper provides five “basic features” of Chinese foreign aid, but these are more 
about principles for how to give aid. The White Paper does not explicitly address how China classifies 
different development finance flow types and classes (State Council 2011). It also states that Chinese 
financial aid flows include grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, and also lists eight forms of 
aid: “complete projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development 
cooperation, medical teams sent abroad, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign 
countries, and debt relief” (State Council 2011). What is more, there is no consensus as to how to classify 
many Chinese financial instruments that lack OECD-DAC counterparts such as natural resource-backed 
loans. So-called Chinese “package financing” means that development finance often consists of 
agreements that mix aid and investment, and/or concessional and non-concessional financing (Grimm et 
al. 2011). Chinese state-owned enterprises also blur the line between official government finance and 
private flows; FDI or joint ventures can come from firms that are either private or state-owned. Finally, 
there may be substantial discrepancies between Western and Chinese considerations of the cost of aid for 
the donor country. Western aid budgets include administrative costs which might inflate statistics on aid 
																																																								
9  The OECD DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts is available online at http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-
glossary.htm. 
7	
	
flows since substantial chunks of aid budgets might be used on donor administrative costs rather than 
directly on recipient development.10 
Analysts still disagree about the nature of Chinese development finance and what can be counted 
as ODA versus OOF. The difficulties to align Chinese development finance with DAC categories are 
further complicated by the fact that many transactions with African countries are in fact bundles of 
several financing mechanisms. Bräutigam (2011) argues that a relatively small amount of finance is given 
as ODA to Africa—only around US$ 1.4 billion in 2007—but the majority comes as OOF. A study by the 
Congressional Research Service and NYU Wagner School took a broader approach, characterizing many 
more types of flows, including state-owned companies investing abroad, as “aid and related activities.” 
They arrived at an estimate of US$ 18 billion in annual aid and related activities to Africa (Lum et al. 
2009). Table 1 displays Chinese development finance estimates provided by these and other previous 
studies. 
These wide-ranging estimates—US$ 0.58 to US$ 18 billion in annual aid to Africa—have 
significant implications for how China should be considered as a donor on the continent in comparison to 
DAC donors. If the upper estimate is to be believed, China gave three times more assistance to Africa in 
2007 than the United States provided in ODA to the continent (US$ 5.3 billion). All DAC donors 
disbursed only US$ 27 billion in ODA to Africa in 2007 (DAC CRS database). Yet high estimates of 
Chinese aid are likely inflated for several reasons discussed below. 
There is a compelling need for a common vocabulary and categorization scheme for Chinese 
development finance. Bräutigam (2009, 2011) demonstrates that many forms of Chinese development 
finance do not fit cleanly into OECD-DAC categorizations. However, neither the research community nor 
the policy community has coalesced around a single taxonomy for classifying and categorizing Chinese 
development finance flows that enables some degree of comparison with development finance flows from 
OECD-DAC donors. Figure 1 introduces the general framework that we employed to categorize different 
types of Chinese development finance. 
Instead of combining aid and investment projects into one omnibus category, we have attempted 
to create more precise classifications and definitions that capture the diversity of Chinese development 
finance modalities. We classify all projects according to one of eleven flow class categories: ODA-like, 
OOF-like, Official Investment, Military Aid without development intent, Joint Ventures with Chinese 
state involvement, Joint Ventures without Chinese state involvement, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
with Chinese state involvement, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) without Chinese state involvement, 
																																																								
10 The authors thank Li Xiaoyun of China Agricultural University (CAU) for this insight. 
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NGO aid, Corporate Aid from state-owned enterprises, and Corporate Aid from private enterprises. Our 
database also has a category called “Vague (Official Finance),” for flows of official financing that are 
either ODA-like or OOF-like, but for which there is insufficient information to assign the flows to either 
the ODA-like or OOF-like category (as well as a further residual category “Vague Residual Commercial 
Activities” for unofficial flows). We define China’s Official Finance as the sum of ODA-like, OOF-like, 
Vague (Official Finance), Official Investment, and Military Aid. The remaining categories capture a 
range of aid and investment activities that involve varying levels of state involvement. While others may 
want to use our dataset for different purposes, the focus of this paper is on non-military and non-
investment official financing from China to Africa, regardless of its developmental, commercial, or 
representational intent.11 We use the term “Official Finance” as shorthand for these official financing 
flows in the remainder of the paper.  
Our categorization scheme has several benefits. It explicitly accounts for the types of Chinese 
overseas financial activities that do not easily fit within existing categorization schemes (e.g., joint 
ventures and investments that involve Chinese state-owned enterprises), while at the same time using 
some categories that can be mapped back onto OECD-DAC definitions with a reasonable degree of 
confidence. In particular, the introduction of “ODA-like,” “OOF-like,” and “Vague Official Finance” 
categories provide a basis for analysts to make more accurate comparisons of official finance provided by 
China and Western donors. Additionally, by introducing the “Vague Official Finance” and “Vague 
Residual Commercial Activities,” we have made the imprecision of our data and the uncertainty of our 
flow-type designations explicit. We consider this last point to be particularly important. At present, many 
scholars who study Chinese aid and investment have refused to be transparent about their data and 
methods. We believe that transparency is a necessary condition for scientific progress because it invites 
and permits scrutiny, which will uncover weaknesses in our methods and errors in their application. 
 
																																																								
11  The data contained in the “unofficial” categories are less complete than the data on official finance. The 
incomplete nature of these data is a by-product of our methodology, which includes search criteria that are geared 
more towards capturing official financing flows (see Strange et al. 2014 for details). Users should therefore proceed 
with caution when using these data. 
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3. TRACKING UNDER-REPORTED FINANCIAL FLOWS: AN OPEN-SOURCE 
APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT FINANCE DATA COLLECTION 
Political scientists, economists, sociologists, geographers, and computer scientists have used open-source 
and media-based data collection methodologies to track violent and non-violent conflict incidents; 
document the scale, scope, and impact of natural and man-made disasters; and study patterns of political 
interaction and sentiment (Schrodt and Gerner 1994; King and Lowe 2003; Shellman 2008; Leetaru 2010; 
Raleigh et al. 2010; Yonamine and Schrodt 2011; EM-DAT 2012; Salehyan et al. 2012). The nature of 
media-based data collection, in particular, presents several unique challenges for data completeness, 
accuracy, quality, and credibility (Woolley 2000; Reeves et al. 2006). First, as with any social scientific 
inquiry, there is potential for human error by the coder. To reduce the risk of human error, each project 
received multiple rounds of arbitration, ensuring that each project entry was reviewed by at least two 
researchers. Second, information extracted from public media outlets cannot substitute for complete and 
accurate statistical data from official sources. Media-based data collection is only as good as the imperfect 
data sources upon which it relies. In the absence of official project-level data, there is no foolproof 
method for adjudicating between conflicting media reports.12 However, because our methodology pulls 
from a diverse set of information repositories, researchers were often able to reconcile competing media 
reports by finding information in government documents, NGO reports, or journal articles. Third, relying 
on media reports poses a risk of “detection bias,” or the risk that countries with lower levels of press 
freedom are less likely to permit journalists to report on official finance activities from various donors. 
Similarly, if the motives of media reporting are economic or political in nature, the objectivity and utility 
of the data are questionable. Among sociologists and scholars who study conflict and terrorism, there is 
an appreciation for the fact that the use of media reports to identify inherently political “events” (e.g., 
political protests, terrorist attacks) introduces a risk of selection bias (McCarthy et al. 1996; Drakos and 
Gofas 2006; Drakos 2007).  
 AidData’s methodology for tracking under-reported financial flows (TUFF) is designed to 
mitigate many of the risks associated with using media reports to collect data. During the first stage, 
projects undertaken in a particular country and supported by a specific supplier of development finance—
																																																								
12 However, it is also not the case that official sources are always more credible (and valuable) than media-based 
information. First, media-based data collection that relies on information regarding the implementation and/or the 
completion of projects can provide more useful and accurate project-level information than official reports, 
depending on how official project information is collected, updated and presented. Second, aid data are politically 
sensitive and might thus be more susceptible to manipulation. In this regard, empirical evidence in Wallace (2011) 
suggests caution in the usage of politically sensitive data provided by authoritarian regimes. 
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be it a sovereign government, multilateral institution, non-governmental organization, or private 
foundation—are identified through Factiva, a Dow Jones-owned media database. Factiva draws on 
approximately 28,000 media sources worldwide in 23 languages. Most of these sources are newspapers, 
radio and television transcripts. In the second stage, researchers perform targeted searches on each 
potential project identified in the first stage to corroborate project information and populate missing data 
fields. In this way, the media reports gathered in the first stage serve as a departure point for a set of 
follow-on data collection procedures that draw information from case studies and field reports completed 
by academics and non-governmental organizations, project inventories supplied through Chinese embassy 
websites, and grant and loan data published by recipient governments.13 
 Our methodological approach is informed by previous attempts to use media reports to track 
Chinese official development financing and expands on these previous methods by supplementing media 
reports with additional information sources. Bartke (1989) was the first scholar to track Chinese aid – 
from the first donations in the 1950s until 1987. In 2008, New York University’s Wagner School and the 
U.S. Congressional Research Service produced a report on Chinese assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, 
and Latin America over the 2002-2007 period (Lum et al. 2009). However, the dataset used to generate 
this report is not publicly available and the authors did not provide details about their methodology. In 
2008, researchers from the World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) also 
published a media-based methodology to identify Chinese infrastructure and natural resource extraction 
projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (Foster et al. 2008). The PPIAF team provided far more methodological 
detail than the NYU Wagner School team, but did not document its data collection procedures in a way 
that could be easily replicated by other researchers.14 Also, subsequent efforts to collect data about 
China’s development and investment activities from media sources (Gallagher et al. 2012; Scissors 2012; 
US EX-IM Bank 2012; Wolf et al. 2013) did not document their data collection procedures in a 
systematic, transparent, or replicable way. In spite of the scientific benefits of transparency and 
replicability, researchers who generate novel Chinese aid and investment data have a strong disincentive 
to disclose their sources or methods in order to preserve reputational benefits and/or the commercial value 
of their data. 
Previous efforts to classify or collect Chinese development finance data have encountered six 
primary challenges. First, although many Chinese projects are cancelled, mothballed, or scaled back after 
																																																								
13 In our background paper (Strange et al. 2014), we describe this methodology in great detail, providing a step-by-
step guide that documents how we conduct these searches and record results during both stages. 
14 AidData’s TUFF methodology is based in part on the methodology developed by the Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF) (Foster et al. 2008; see also Strange et al. 2014). 
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the original announcement is made, previous data collection initiatives did not carefully “follow the 
money” from initial announcement to implementation, thus increasing the risk of over-counting 
(Bräutigam 2011). Therefore, we conducted follow-up audits on all announced projects in order to 
mitigate the risk of mistaking project announcements for initiated or completed projects. Second, 
researchers have paid insufficient attention to double-counting of individual projects and activities 
reported by multiple media reports over multiple years (Grimm et al. 2011). To address this challenge, we 
employ a web-based data platform with filtering and keyword search functions that facilitate the 
identification and elimination of duplicate projects. Third, most scholars and analysts elide the issue of 
how to classify different forms of Chinese development finance. Rather than rolling all aid and 
investment projects into one category, we classified all projects according to one of twelve flow-type 
categories introduced in Section 2 (see again Figure 1). 
 Fourth, a lack of transparency in research methods has impeded efforts to improve knowledge 
about the distribution and impact of Chinese development finance. Documenting and disclosing research 
methods allows database users to identify potential errors and procedural flaws and thus facilitates the 
improvement of methods and data quality. Fifth, unlike previous efforts that rely only on English-
language sources to track Chinese aid, trained Chinese-language experts conducted Chinese-language 
search queries to fill data gaps and enhance data accuracy. Finally, wherever possible, we avoided a 
“sole-sourcing” data collection process, or relying on data from a single source to track Chinese 
development finance projects. We instead employed a triangulation system wherein multiple sources for 
the same project provided data about different project attributes. More broadly, source triangulation 
helped minimize data deficiencies resulting from uncertainty over whether certain projects were actually 
undertaken and completed following their announcement. Because this triangulation process pulled from 
multiple information repositories, it reduces a project record’s reliance on media reports. 
The TUFF methodology has drawn criticism for its integration of data culled from news reports, 
which may be biased and incomplete (e.g., Provost and Harris 2013). However, until recently, few 
critiques have brought to bear independent sources of information that shed light on the accuracy and the 
comprehensiveness of the TUFF methodology. Muchapondwa et al. (2013) is an exception, employing 
“ground-truthing” techniques – that is, have local enumerators follow a standardized set of site visit and 
interview to verify and update existing project records and uncover previously unidentified projects – to 
test the robustness of the methodology for tracking Chinese development finance activities in Uganda and 
South Africa. Their results suggest that, while data collected through local informants with official roles 
in the Chinese-financed projects reveal new and additional information not available through open source 
materials, TUFF provides a credible data collection methodology for scholars seeking to learn about 
12	
	
development finance from governments that do not disclose comprehensive official information about 
their outgoing financial flows. 
 
4. NEW EVIDENCE ON CHINESE OFFICIAL FINANCE TO AFRICA 
Our database on Chinese official finance includes 1,751 non-investment projects to 50 recipient countries 
over the 2000-2011 period.15 These values (and the subsequent analysis) do not include data for two types 
of official finance: Official Investments and Military Aid without development intent. This is because the 
objective of AidData’s data collection initiative was to track Chinese official development finance; as a 
result, project reporting for these two flow classes is likely not as comprehensive.16 Focusing thus on non-
investment official finance to Africa, 13.6% of the projects remain non-binding pledges.17 Figure 2 shows 
the composition of projects over time, separating pledges from committed projects, those currently being 
implemented, and completed projects. This does not necessarily mean that a project has not reached the 
next stage of completion; it only means that we did not find any information in open source materials that 
one of the subsequent stages has been reached. Since we cannot be sure that these projects do indeed get 
formally committed, we exclude pledges from the analysis below (239 projects amounting to US$ 24.6 
billion; this value and all following values are in constant 2009 US dollars).18 By doing so, we intend to 
achieve comparability with aid commitments as defined by the OECD-DAC. 
In what follows, we analyze the remaining 1,511 projects to 50 recipient countries that have 
reached at least commitment stage. 63% of the projects provide information on the amount of official 
finance committed, totaling US$ 73 billion. Note that this covers all financial flows that can be classified 
as either ODA-like or OOF-like (including “vague” projects that are identified as one of the two). Figure 
																																																								
15 We also collected data for 2012. However, we decided to exclude these data from our analysis as the numbers for 
2012 may be lower as a result of limited accumulated media information compared to previous years. The number of 
projects from more recent years is likely to increase in future updates of this database as more information becomes 
available. 
16 The initial dataset contains 27 Official Investment projects, as well as dozens of projects coded as either FDI or 
Joint Ventures with or without state involvement. We leave the systematic collection of China’s investment flows 
through media sources for future research. 
17  Pledges are informal agreements while commitments are defined as formal written, binding, contracts. 
Determinations are based on a set of key words discussed in our methodology document (Strange et al. 2014). 
18 As noted by Bräutigam (2009: 49), many “plump promises” reported in the media never materialize. By excluding 
pledges and focusing on flows that have at least reached the commitment stage, we follow a common practice in aid 
statistics and in empirical analyses on aid. 
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3 shows the yearly number of projects and dollar amounts over the study period. As shown in the figure, 
these two measures of China’s official finance to Africa are highly correlated (0.82) and show an 
increasing trend over time. In 2000, we were able to identify 47 projects (US$ 2.4 billion), and by 2010 
we found more than three times these numbers and amounts: 160 projects (US$ 10 billion).19 
The plurality of the projects included in our data are in-kind contributions (25%), although these 
projects typically have smaller monetary values and amount to only 3% of the total dollar amount tracked. 
The second-largest category covers monetary grants (excluding debt forgiveness, 23% of projects), 
followed by loans (excluding debt rescheduling, 21%), free-standing technical assistance (8%), 
scholarships and other training (4%), vague grants (4%), and debt forgiveness (4%).20 Within these flow 
types the likelihood that the monetary value of a project is reported varies substantially. For example, 
92% of loan projects have a reported monetary value, while only 9% of the (supposedly cheaper) projects 
of the category “Scholarships/training in the donor country” have a dollar amount. 
Figure 4 shows the allocation of these projects according to the nature of the financial flow. We 
distinguish between ODA-like projects, OOF-like projects, and Vague Official Finance. Vague Official 
Finance refers to projects that are clearly either ODA or OOF, but for which the available information is 
insufficient to assign projects to one category or another. A good example of a project classified as Vague 
Official Finance is a concessional loan to Sierra Leone’s telecommunication company, Sierratel, for US$ 
16.8 million (project identification number 53), where the degree of concessionality is unknown.21 As can 
be seen from Figure 4, the largest category in terms of project numbers is ODA-like grants (688 projects, 
amounting to US$ 5,100 million). This category includes, among many other things, donations of 
agricultural machinery and food aid. We count 41 OOF-like grants and 55 grants coded to be vague due 
to insufficient information. Loans are also of quantitative importance. We classify 108 loans as ODA-like 
(amounting to US$ 5,539 million), 31 as OOF-like (US$ 18,361 million), and 182 as Vague Official 
Finance (US$ 29,672 million). There are thus a significant number of loans for which we have no detailed 
financial information that prevents us from coding them as either ODA-like or OOF-like. 58 projects—57 
of them coded as ODA-like—are classified as debt relief (debt rescheduling agreements and debt 
forgiveness). An additional 185 projects are classified as technical assistance and scholarships (151 of 
																																																								
19 Note, however, that the amount of detail available for flows to particular countries varies considerably. Appendix 
A-1 shows the share of projects per country where we lack information on the monetary value of the projects. 
20 The corresponding shares in US dollars are 7% (monetary grants), 73% (loans), 0.24% (free-standing technical 
assistance), 0.004% (scholarships), 0.35% (vague grants), and 5.5% (debt forgiveness). Grants are coded as “grants 
(vague)” if the corresponding media reports lack information on whether the grant was provided in kind or in cash. 
21 We apply the same coding procedure when donor intent is unclear. 
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which receive the ODA-like designation). Although small in terms of project numbers, export credits are 
important in terms of their monetary value (US$ 4,385 million). 
Given the interest in China’s role in Africa vis-à-vis Western donors, we also compare annual 
official financing flows from China with those from the United States and the entire OECD-DAC. Figure 
5 demonstrates that in the early-2000s China was already providing almost the amount of official 
financing to Africa as the United States. At the peak in 2007, China was providing almost twice the 
amount of total U.S.-ODA and -OOF, and almost half the amount of ODA and OOF to Africa from the 
entire OECD-DAC combined. All three trend upward over time. Chinese financing flows to Africa can 
vary dramatically from year to year, often due to megadeals: multi-million dollar financing packages for 
large infrastructure projects or other loans. The spike in 2007 is due to two large Chinese megadeals; 
including large loans to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.22 Over the entire 2000-2011 
period, China committed US$ 73 billion in official flows to Africa, which is more than a fifth of the total 
OECD-DAC flows (US$ 361 billion) and almost as much as committed by the United States (US$ 83 
billion).  
 Figure 6 restricts the analysis to Chinese and Western flows of official development assistance (or 
what we call ODA-like flows). Chinese flows to Africa identified as ODA have been lower than those of 
Western donors. Over the entire decade China committed US$ 15 billion in ODA to Africa, which is 4% 
of the total OECD-DAC ODA flows (US$ 347 billion) and 19% of those of the United States (US$ 81 
billion). However, an important caveat here is that our estimates of Chinese ODA are likely significantly 
devalued since a substantial chunk of Chinese official finance is labeled as “Vague Official Finance.” 
These projects are cases that we are able to classify as official Chinese finance but do not have enough 
information to discern whether a project should be considered as OOF or ODA. Figure 6 includes these 
flows as a separate item for comparison. Only in 2010, these combined flows exceed ODA by the United 
States.23 
Which sectors receive the most projects? Figures 7 and 8 turn to the sectoral allocation of China’s 
official projects in Africa. While we lack sufficient information on 214 projects, the most important sector 
																																																								
22 Appendix A-2 shows the 20 largest projects in our sample by commitment size. Very large projects with project 
size of US$ 1 billion are often called “megadeals.” 13 projects in our sample would fall under this definition. 
Consistent with conventional perceptions in the literature, we observe a large number of loans as well as many 
projects in the infrastructure and energy sectors in this sample. 
23 It should also be noted that as the dataset is missing financial values for 37% of Chinese projects, these project 
amounts are not captured in the comparative analysis. Thus, dollar amounts of Chinese Official Finance and ODA 
are both likely to be undercounted in comparison to OECD-DAC and US figures. 
15	
	
according to DAC purpose codes is Government and Civil Society (Figure 7), with an overall number of 
209 projects, amounting to US$ 1,718 million. While it might seem surprising at first that China is so 
active in this sector, some of Beijing’s activities differ much from Western donors. Whereas DAC 
activities in this sector include strengthening public financial management systems, supporting anti-
corruption institutions, and a wide variety of “good governance” initiatives, Chinese support to the sector 
includes, among other things, the construction of presidential estates and executive office suites.24 Health 
(182 projects), Education (149), and Transport and Storage (107) are on the following places. Examples 
of projects in these sectors include support for the creation of a China-Liberia malaria prevention center 
(Health); scholarships for Zimbabweans to undertake undergraduate and postgraduate studies in China 
(Education); and the rehabilitation of the Kigali road network in Rwanda (Transport and Storage). 
 In terms of monetary amounts (Figure 8), Transport and Storage projects dominate (US$ 17,230 
million), followed by Other Multisector (US$ 16,937 million) and Energy Generation and Supply (US$ 
13,301 million). These sectors are also outstanding in terms of project size. The largest average size in 
monetary values have projects in Other Multisector (US$ 529 million), followed by Energy Generation 
and Supply (US$ 261 million) and Transport and Storage (US$ 215 million). At the bottom of the list, 
only four projects each are classified under Women in Development, two under Support to NGOs and 
GOs, and only one each under Non-food Commodity Assistance and General Budget Support.25 We could 
not track a single project in the sector “General Environmental Protection.” Appendix A-3 shows the 
number of projects allocated to sectors over time. 
 Appendices A-4 and A-5 report the sectoral distribution of Chinese projects identified as ODA-
like for comparison. As can be seen, the largest number of Chinese aid projects is in the health sector (154 
projects accounting for US$ 696 million), followed by Government and Civil Society (148, US$ 1,025 
million), Education (115, US$ 108 million), and Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (73, US$ 1,090 
million). In terms of volume, Actions Related to Debt (US$ 4,085 million) and Transport and Storage 
(US$ 2,881 million) account for the largest numbers. The sectoral distribution of Chinese aid to Africa 
stands in contrast to the pattern of behavior observed among DAC donors and most multilateral donors 
controlled by DAC governments. Over the last decade, Western donors have channeled the lion’s share of 
																																																								
24 Projects carried out by China include judicial training in Angola, the renovation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Liberia, the construction of the National Assembly building in the Seychelles or a financial contribution to 
facilitate the last phase of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference. 
25 Specifically, the Chinese Embassy in Harare donated in 2006 teaching equipment to the Women's University in 
Africa of Zimbabwe to promote gender equality and empowerment and also supported the Malawian Ministry of 
Women and Child Development in 2009. 
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their funding (nearly 50%) into social and humanitarian sectors (Lyne et al. 2009; OECD 2012). This 
lends some degree of support to the notion that Chinese aid is complementary to assistance from Western 
donors (Moss and Rose 2006). 
 Table 2 outlines the ten largest recipients of official finance from China, the United States, and 
the OECD-DAC as a whole, aggregating flows from 2000-2011. Four of the top ten recipient countries 
are consistent across all three donors: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan.26 
A number of countries may not make the top ten lists for all three donors, but still receive a significant 
amount of finance from China and the DAC. For instance, Ghana is first on the list for China, and 
although it is not in the top ten for the US or DAC it is a very large recipient of Western funding as well 
(Ghana takes the 11th spot on the DAC recipient list and the 12th spot for the US). Zimbabwe, for 
example, is a notable exception as the country is a top recipient of Chinese official finance but not of 
DAC flows. An aggregate comparison across all three donors suggests that a large percentage of both 
Chinese and Western official financial flows go to many of the same governments and regions in Africa. 
However, it does mask differences in the modalities and sectors of funding. Although Sudan is a top 
recipient from all three donors, the types of funding are vastly different; China has had a large focus on 
the oil pipeline and infrastructure in the eastern corridor, whereas DAC donors have largely concentrated 
funding in social sectors and conflict regions such as Darfur. 
 Figure 9 plots each country’s share in the total number of China’s official projects in Africa. Nine 
African states individually received at least 3% of all Chinese official finance projects to Africa from 
2000-2011. Only two of these countries (Ghana and Liberia) are situated in West Africa, while the rest 
are all either in Eastern or Southern Africa. Over the entire 2000-2011 period, Zimbabwe received the 
largest number of projects (101), followed by Ghana (67), Ethiopia (63), Kenya (61), Liberia (59), and 
Sudan (53). The fewest number went to Libya (2), South Sudan (5), Chad (6), Benin, and Cape Verde (7 
each). Since South Sudan was not an independent country until 2011, it is not surprising that the young 
country has received such a small number of projects over our study period. Also, it is not surprising that 
we did not track any Chinese official project in Burkina Faso, Swaziland, the Gambia, and São Tomé and 
Príncipe between 2000 and 2011. During the 2000-2011 period, none of these countries maintain 
diplomatic relations with the PRC and recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) instead. Appendix A-6 
shows China’s allocation of projects by country over time. 
 Finally, Figure 10 shows China’s official finance by recipient country as a share of the recipient’s 
gross national income (GNI). This measure is a commonly used indicator for aid dependency. In general, 
																																																								
26 South Sudan is counted as a separate country in the dataset after its independence in 2011. 
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Chinese official finance does not tend to be particularly high compared to African countries’ economic 
size. There are a few exceptions such as Equatorial Guinea (4.8%), Ghana (4.1%), the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (2.9%) and Zimbabwe (2.8%). Given the increasing trend of Chinese activities in 
Africa, this is likely to change in the foreseeable future. 
 
5. REVISITING THE AID-CONFLICT NEXUS 
The impact of development finance on the incidence, duration, and severity of conflict in recipient 
countries has been extensively studied (e.g., Grossman 1992; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Esman and 
Herring 2003; De Ree and Nillesen 2009; Nunn and Qian 2013; Crost et al. forthcoming). This literature 
is, however, largely limited to Western sources of development finance; all of it ignores Chinese aid. This 
is an important omission, potentially so important that its inclusion might challenge the results of 
previous papers. To the extent that China gives aid where Western donors are absent and increases aid 
where Western donors retreat, ignoring Chinese aid severely biases the results of the existing studies. 
As one example, consider Nielsen et al. (2011). Nielsen et al. combine data on bilateral and 
multilateral aid (excluding China and other important non-DAC donors) with data provided by the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). They run a rare-event logit analysis of time-series, cross-sectional data on 
2,627 conflict events across 139 states over the 1981-2005 period. They find (among other results) that 
aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict onsets. 27 We replicate this study, 
adding our data on Chinese aid to their database.  
 Our data allow us to test an important hypothesis: If “traditional” donors suddenly cut aid, 
recipient governments with close ties to other important donors, such as China, reduce the probability of 
violent conflict by offsetting aid shocks with such alternative funding sources. Following Nielsen et al. 
(2011), we hypothesize that aid shocks do not translate into armed conflict onset if countries have access 
to sufficient funding from China following shocks in aid from Western donors. The availability of 
Chinese funds could enable governments to provide side-payments or military investments to prevent 
potential rebels from challenging them. The conclusion of aid deals with Beijing might also serve as a 
signal to potential rebels that the government can credibly commit to side-payments and thus prevent 
significant shifts in the distribution of power. In this section, we test whether Chinese commitments to 
																																																								
27 Nielsen et al. (2011) define foreign aid “shocks” as severe decreases in aid revenue. They measure it using a 
binary indicator that takes the value of one if the change in the aid-over-GDP ratio (averaged over the last two years) 
is below the 15th percentile of that variable’s level. While the aid data employed in Nielson et al. also cover ODA 
flows from some non-DAC donors, the bulk of the financial flows covered in this study are provided by the group of 
“traditional” donors. Their data does not include Chinese aid. 
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provide development finance in the aftermath of a shock in aid by other donors can mitigate the effect of 
drastic changes in “traditional” aid flows on intrastate conflict. 
 We replicate the original study as follows. We reproduce Model (1) of Table 1 in Nielsen et al. 
(2011: 226) using 2000-2005 conflict data for Africa rather than the original 1981-2005 worldwide 
sample, given that our database exclusively covers information on Chinese development finance projects 
committed since 2000 to African recipient countries. As conflicts are not rare in Africa (5.3%of all post-
2000 observations are conflicts), we run our models using logit regressions rather than rare-events logit. 
In order to analyze the impact of Chinese development activities on conflict onset, we add one of three 
measures of the intensity of Chinese development activities in a particular country at a time to the main 
regression in Nielsen et al. (2011). The first measure is the total number of China’s official finance 
projects, the second is the total number of ODA-like projects and the third is the US$ amount of China’s 
official finance directed to a particular country as a share of the recipient’s GNI. The two measures based 
on project numbers have the advantage that they account for the entire universe of projects unveiled by 
the TUFF methodology. While the third measure based on monetary amounts has the drawback that it 
excludes those projects for which we could not identify the monetary value of the project, it has the 
advantage that it accounts for the size of the project and that of the recipient’s economy.28 
 We present the results of our empirical analysis in Table 3. The first column replicates Model 1 
from Table 1 of Nielsen et al. (2011). The second column repeats the same regression, but employs logit 
rather than rare-event logit for the reason explained above. Our third and fourth columns demonstrate that 
the main results of Nielsen et al. (2011) hold if we first restrict the period of analysis to the 2000-2005 
period and then further reduce the sample to cover African countries only. 
 As a next step, we introduce our three measures of Chinese development activities and their 
interactions terms with the aid shock dummy in columns 5-7 of Table 3. Since the coefficients in a non-
linear model with interaction terms cannot be directly interpreted (Ai and Norton 2003), Table 4 
computes the average marginal effects of aid shocks on conflict onset at different levels of Chinese 
development finance. We find that aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict 
onset if no sufficient alternative funding from China is available. As can be seen in the table, the effect of 
aid shocks on conflict remains statistically significant at conventional levels only at low levels of Chinese 
development activities. More precisely, we find that aid shocks do not significantly increase the 
likelihood of conflict onset if the number of Chinese projects exceeds three (columns 1 and 2). 
																																																								
28 Note that we do not lag our measures of Chinese development activities even though Nielsen et al. (2011) lag the 
"aid shock" dummy in their estimations. This is crucial, as China and the recipient need time to react to a sudden 
drop in aid from other donors. By taking this approach, we assume the availability of Chinese funding to matter at 
the time of the (potential) outbreak of a conflict. 
19	
	
Accounting for the monetary value of the development projects and the size of the economy, column 3 
shows that aid shocks do not translate into conflict if the amount of Chinese official finance as a share of 
recipient GNI amounts to 1% or more. These findings suggest that the availability of funding from China 
mitigates the impact of aid shocks from “traditional” donors on conflict onset. 
 As Nielsen et al. (2011) argue, incoming aid flows are often unstable despite the fact that many 
developing countries rely on them for a substantial portion of national expenditures. Instability resulting 
from sudden aid withdrawals are thus a major concern for developing states, making alternative sources 
of funding beyond “traditional” donors even more critical. Our results suggest that Chinese development 
finance may have a stabilizing effect in weak governments. More broadly, the findings highlight the 
importance of gathering better data on the development activities of China and other non-traditional 
donors to better understand the link between foreign aid and conflict. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
As some Western governments scale back their development finance commitments, non-Western donors 
are rapidly expanding their overseas aid activities. The most important provider of official finance to 
Africa among these non-DAC donor countries is China. Yet many non-DAC donors, including China, 
lack either the capacity or the political will to provide detailed information about their aid activities. 
Scholars are increasingly handicapped in their ability to study aid allocation and the impact of non-
Western development finance on development, political and conflict outcomes. 
 Based on insights from previous projects tracking conflicts, disasters, aid, investment and other 
political and economic phenomena through open source data collection techniques, we have crafted a 
systematic, transparent and replicable methodology that triangulates and curates information from a wide 
range of sources that are largely independent from each other. Apart from contributing to the literature on 
development finance, we pursued this project as a proof of concept exercise to test the viability of a web-
based, open source data collection approach. Its application has uncovered more than US$ 73 billion in 
commitments of official Chinese financing flows to Africa that were previously unrecorded—in a single 
location and with a single, consistent methodology—at the project level. We hope that this database will 
be used and continuously improved by scholars, practitioners, policymakers and other interested 
stakeholders. Ideally, Chinese government agencies would disclose detailed and comprehensive official 
data at the project level, thus obviating the need for researchers to devote time and effort to construct sub-
optimal data sets through media sources. However, at this time, Beijing has not announced any intention 
of joining the international aid transparency movement. 
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 Several important observations can be made about 21st century Chinese official finance to Africa. 
First, with respect to the geographic distribution of China’s official finance, we find that China’s activities 
are spread all over the African continent. Only countries recognizing Taiwan do not show up among 
China’s recipients of official finance flows. According to the dollar amounts tracked, the largest recipient 
appears to be Ghana followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia. Second, with respect 
to the sectoral distribution, we find that China is active in almost all sectors, with “General environmental 
protection” being a notable exception. While conventional wisdom that infrastructure plays an important 
role has been confirmed by the TUFF approach, the sector “Government and Civil Society” plays the 
most important role in terms of project numbers. Unsurprisingly in the Chinese case, projects in this 
sector are about “Government” and not “Civil Society.” Third, with respect to the trend over time, 
Chinese activities as a financier of development activities are increasing and are by today roughly 
comparable to the size of activities provided by the United States. When looking at ODA-like flows 
exclusively, however, China still is clearly behind the United States. 
 Moreover, the results presented in this paper suggest that Chinese development finance merits 
greater attention within the conflict studies literature. Extending the work of Nielsen et al. (2011), the 
empirical application of our dataset has shown that aid shocks from “traditional” sources are more likely 
to induce conflict onset only if insufficient alternative funding is available from China. This underscores 
the necessity of creating, improving and utilizing new sources of information to understand the 
development activities of China and other non-DAC donors. 
 Finally, going forward, we hope to continue improving the accuracy, precision, and 
comprehensiveness of the TUFF methodology used to produce our project-level dataset of Chinese 
development finance to Africa. We have identified seven possible steps for future research. First, we plan 
to collect and integrate more data from development practitioners, journalists, researchers and other local 
stakeholders in Africa. Second, future iterations of the dataset should include more diverse language 
searching throughout both stages of the data collection process. Third, we will prioritize supplementary 
data collection for the project records in our database that lack financial values. Fourth, we intend to 
geocode the precise latitude and longitude coordinates of all projects and analyze the spatial distribution 
of Chinese development finance. Sub-nationally georeferenced data will help address a range of questions 
focused on the nature, scope and aims of Chinese development finance in Africa. Fifth, efforts should be 
made to more systematically track unofficial and quasi-official activities to provide a more complete 
picture of how China supports African development. Sixth, the application of TUFF data collection 
methods to one or more DAC donors (for whom we have official project-level data) could help reveal the 
biases and shortcomings of the methodology. Seventh, one could adapt the TUFF methodology to more 
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effectively track development finance flows from other non-transparent donor governments, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 
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Table 1. Estimates of Chinese development finance to Africa 
Source Year Amount per year Flow type 
Bräutigam (2011a) 2007 US$ 1.4B ODA
Wang (2007) 2004-2005 US$ 1-1.5B ODA
The Economist (2004) 2002 US$ 1.8B ODA
Lum et al. (2009) 2007 US$ 17.96B Aid and related activities 
Christensen (2010) 2009 US$ 2.1B Aid
Lancaster (2007) 2007 US$ 582-875M* Aid
He (2006) 1956-2006 US$ 5.7B** Aid
Kurlantzick (2006) 2004 US$ 2.7B Aid
Fitch Ratings (2011) 2001-2010 US$ 67.2B EXIM Bank loans 
Alden and Alves (2009) 2006 US$ 12-15B EXIM Bank loans 
Harman (2007) 2006 US$ 12.5B EXIM Bank loans 
Christensen (2010) 2009 US$ 375M Debt relief 
* Authors’ calculations based on mid-point of the estimated range of total Chinese aid ($1.5-2B), and the estimated range of Africa financing 
(33%-50%). 
** Author’s estimation for the entire 50-year time period. 
 
 
Table 2. Ten largest recipients of Official Finance to Africa (ODA and OOF), 2000-2011 
                    China                     United States                     DAC 
1. Ghana (US$ 11.6B)           1. Egypt (US$ 7.6B)           1. Nigeria (US$ 28.8B) 
2. DRC (US$ 7.8B)           2. Ethiopia (US$ 6.9B)           2. DRC (US$ 21.9B) 
3. Ethiopia (US$ 6.6B)           3.  Sudan (US$ 6.8B)           3. Tanzania (US$ 19.6B) 
4. Sudan (US$ 5.3B)           4. DRC (US$ 5.8B)           4. Mozambique (US$ 17.9B) 
5. Angola (US$ 4.2B)           5. Kenya (US$ 5.5B)           5. Egypt (US$ 16.5B) 
6. Equatorial Guinea (US$ 3.7B)           6. Nigeria (US$ 4.2B)           6. Ethiopia (US$ 16.1B) 
7. Zimbabwe (US$ 3.5B)           7. South Africa (US$ 3.6B)           7. Kenya (US$ 14.6B) 
8. Nigeria (US$ 3.1B)           8. Uganda (US$ 3.5B)           8. Sudan (US$ 14.0B) 
9. Cameroon (US$ 3.0B)           9. Tanzania (US$ 3.4B)           9. Morocco (US$ 12.6B) 
10. South Africa (US$ 2.3B)           10. Mozambique (US$ 3B)           10. Uganda (US$ 12B) 
Source: AidData's Chinese Official Finance to Africa Dataset, Version 1.1 and OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System. 
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Table 3. Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (regression results) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)
                      Baseline  Baseline Baseline Baseline Interaction 1 Interaction 2  Interaction 3
   RE Logit  Logit  Logit Logit Logit Logit  Logit
   Full sample  Full sample 2000‐2005 2000‐2005 2000‐2005 2000‐2005  2000‐2005
   Full sample  All countries All countries Africa only Africa only Africa only  Africa only
Aid shock         0.911***         0.937***       1.681***       4.063**        3.980*          4.109*           5.209** 
                           (0.001)          (0.001)        (0.006)        (0.017)        (0.057)         (0.057)          (0.048)   
Number of OF projects                                                                      ‐2.761**                                 
                                                                                         (0.039)                                   
Aid shock * Number OF                                                                       2.446                                   
                                                                                         (0.139)                                   
Number of ODA projects                                                                                      ‐6.637**                 
                                                                                                         (0.040)                   
Aid shock * Number ODA                                                                                       6.384*                  
                                                                                                         (0.055)                   
OF amount/GNI                                                                                                        0.235   
                                                                                                                          (0.507)   
Aid shock * OF amount/GNI                                                                                                       ‐2.233*  
                                                                                                                          (0.081)   
Positive aid shock         0.154            0.150          0.406         ‐1.070          1.136           0.393           ‐1.252   
                           (0.672)          (0.683)        (0.585)        (0.349)        (0.551)         (0.797)          (0.405)   
Human rights violations         0.607***         0.625***       0.557*         0.497          0.618           0.154            0.280   
                           (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.081)        (0.565)        (0.480)         (0.850)          (0.741)   
Assassinations         0.136            0.123          0.428         ‐1.376         ‐1.851          ‐1.612           ‐2.034   
                           (0.168)          (0.216)        (0.183)        (0.312)        (0.105)         (0.229)          (0.169)   
Riots         0.014           ‐0.009         ‐0.213                                                                 
                           (0.917)          (0.944)        (0.717)                                                                 
General strikes         0.015           ‐0.019         ‐0.154                                                                 
                           (0.944)          (0.927)        (0.819)                                                                 
Antigov. demonstrations        ‐0.053           ‐0.066         ‐0.510         ‐2.902         ‐1.882          ‐2.149           ‐3.062   
                           (0.672)          (0.598)        (0.175)        (0.151)        (0.292)         (0.283)          (0.217)   
Infant mortality         0.003            0.004         ‐0.002         ‐0.002         ‐0.009          ‐0.003           ‐0.002   
                           (0.473)          (0.462)        (0.840)        (0.949)        (0.742)         (0.931)          (0.965)   
Bad neighborhood        ‐0.038           ‐0.048         ‐0.095          0.725*         1.074**         0.860*           0.703   
                           (0.747)          (0.690)        (0.714)        (0.092)        (0.034)         (0.079)          (0.174)   
Partial autocracy         0.230            0.231         ‐0.294         17.091***      24.386***       25.346***        17.519***
                           (0.490)          (0.492)        (0.762)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)   
Partial democracy        ‐0.669           ‐0.741         ‐1.212         15.878***      23.361***       24.271***        16.264***
                           (0.157)          (0.120)        (0.244)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)   
Factional democracy         0.681*           0.698*         0.061         16.127***      23.048***       23.948***        16.743***
                           (0.077)          (0.073)        (0.959)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)   
Full democracy         0.176            0.164         ‐2.653**                                                               
                           (0.747)          (0.766)        (0.032)                                                                 
ln(GDP per capita)        ‐0.200           ‐0.198         ‐0.182          0.182          0.384           0.243            0.112   
                           (0.401)          (0.410)        (0.654)        (0.786)        (0.655)         (0.780)          (0.912)   
ln(Population)         0.090            0.100          0.212         ‐0.044         ‐0.234          ‐0.262           ‐0.013   
                           (0.283)          (0.238)        (0.359)        (0.904)        (0.639)         (0.524)          (0.978)   
Oil         0.010***         0.009***       0.051***       0.679***       1.209***        1.376***         0.791***
                           (0.001)          (0.002)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.001)         (0.001)          (0.000)   
Instability         0.225            0.224         ‐0.196          0.963          1.642**         1.620*           1.053   
                           (0.407)          (0.414)        (0.755)        (0.239)        (0.048)         (0.052)          (0.246)   
Ethnic frac.         1.341**          1.405**        2.404          4.073*         5.129*          5.275*           2.789   
                           (0.022)          (0.017)        (0.166)        (0.062)        (0.073)         (0.091)          (0.283)   
Religious frac.        ‐0.738           ‐0.771         ‐1.002          2.182          4.517           4.134            3.728   
                           (0.273)          (0.257)        (0.477)        (0.454)        (0.205)         (0.341)          (0.291)   
Noncontiguous         0.985***         0.981***       1.137          0.907          4.593**         5.018**          0.629   
                           (0.002)          (0.002)        (0.117)        (0.662)        (0.020)         (0.045)          (0.780)   
Mountains         0.086            0.091          0.076         ‐0.337         ‐0.351          ‐0.103           ‐0.315   
                           (0.359)          (0.338)        (0.672)        (0.352)        (0.425)         (0.811)          (0.488)   
Cold War         0.163            0.176                                                                                
                           (0.567)          (0.540)                                                                                
Spline 1        ‐0.003           ‐0.002          0.214         ‐0.831         ‐0.733          ‐0.701           ‐1.378   
                           (0.501)          (0.516)        (0.623)        (0.568)        (0.622)         (0.652)          (0.456)   
Spline 2         0.004            0.004         ‐0.337          0.656          0.200           0.170            1.433   
                           (0.331)          (0.348)        (0.514)        (0.762)        (0.937)         (0.942)          (0.533)   
Spline 3        ‐0.003           ‐0.002          0.397          0.181          1.104           1.143           ‐0.594   
                           (0.294)          (0.321)        (0.407)        (0.947)        (0.752)         (0.700)          (0.789)   
Constant        ‐5.797**         ‐6.148**       ‐7.655        ‐28.753***     ‐36.406***      ‐35.372***       ‐29.250*  
                           (0.046)          (0.036)        (0.133)        (0.007)        (0.008)         (0.006)          (0.065)   
Number of observations          2627             2627            719            188            188             188             185   
Number of countries           139              139            128             39             39              39              39   
AIC                             .          723.003        203.893         83.386         83.222          82.125           83.939   
BIC                             .          875.717        318.339        151.351        157.660         156.564          158.007   
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Table 4. Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (marginal effects) 
                      (1)  (2)  (3) 
                      Numbers OF  Numbers ODA  OF amount/GNI 
Effect of Aid shock at different levels of Chinese 
development finance          
0         0.202*           0.190**          0.206*** 
                           (0.064)          (0.040)          (0.009)    
1         0.215***         0.198***         0.069    
                           (0.005)          (0.004)          (0.253)    
2         0.200**          0.190**          0.009    
                           (0.017)          (0.018)          (0.804)    
3         0.184*           0.178*          ‐0.010    
                           (0.080)          (0.084)          (0.520)    
4         0.169            0.162           ‐0.018    
                           (0.192)          (0.203)          (0.192)    
5         0.154            0.146           ‐0.024    
                           (0.310)          (0.326)          (0.149)    
6         0.139            0.132           ‐0.028    
                           (0.404)          (0.431)          (0.235)    
7         0.124            0.119           ‐0.033    
                           (0.485)          (0.515)          (0.331)    
8         0.110            0.107           ‐0.038    
                           (0.548)          (0.581)          (0.414)    
9         0.097            0.096           ‐0.044    
                           (0.596)          (0.736)          (0.481)    
Number of observations           188              188              185    
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Figure 1. A classification scheme of Chinese Official and Unofficial Finance 
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Figure 2. Share of each reported status of all projects over time, 2000-2011 
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Figure 3. Chinese official finance reported over time, 2000-2011 
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Figure 4. Number of Chinese projects by type of flow, 2000-2011 
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Figure 5. Chinese, OECD-DAC, and US Official flows over time, 2000-2011 
0
10
20
30
40
A
m
ou
nt
 in
 b
illi
on
s 
of
 c
on
st
an
t 2
00
9 
U
S
D
2000 2005 2010
year
DAC ODA&OOF to Africa US ODA&OOF to Africa
Chinese ODA&OOF to Africa
 
 
Figure 6. Chinese, OECD-DAC and US ODA over time, 2000-2011 
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Note: The figure displays Chinese ODA both including vague flows (upper dotted line) and excluding these flows that cannot be 
identified as either ODA or OOF (lower dotted line)
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Figure 7. Number of Chinese projects by sector, 2000-2011 
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Figure 8. Monetary amount of Chinese official finance by sector, 2000-2011 
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Figure 9. Percentage of China’s official projects to Africa by recipient country, 2000-2011 
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Figure 10. China’s official finance to Africa by recipient country as percentage of GNI, 2000-2011 
average 
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Appendix A-1. Share of projects without information on their monetary value 
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Burundi
Egypt
Rwanda
Comoros
Equatorial Guinea
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Botswana
Algeria
Morocco
Guinea
Namibia
Cape Verde
Tunisia
Africa, regional
Gabon
Sierra Leone
South Africa
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Appendix A-2. List of the 20 largest projects (in millions of US$), 2000-2011 
Recipient Year Project Flow Class Flow Status Value  
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2007 Infrastructure for mines barter deal (Sicomines) OOF-like Loan Implementation 7160 
Ghana 2010 China offers 6 billion USD concessionary loan Vague (OF) Loan Implementation 5485 
Ghana 2009 3 billion USD loan from China Development Bank for oil project, road project, others OOF-like Loan Implementation 3000 
Equatorial Guinea 2006 $2b oil-backed loan OOF-like Loan Completion 2692 
Ethiopia 2009 Concessional Ex-Im Bank Loan for Dam Construction Vague (OF) Loan Pipeline: Commitment 2249 
South Africa 2011 Financial Cooperation Agreement Vague (OF) Vague Pipeline: Commitment 2072 
Africa, regional 2000 $1 billion of African debt cancelled; may not be bilateral ODA-like Debt forgiveness Completion 1697 
Angola 2004 Phase 1 of National Rehabilitation Project OOF-like Loan Implementation 1507 
Sudan 2007 Construction of railway from Khartoum to Port Sudan OOF-like Export credits Completion 1377 
Angola 2009 1.2 billion USD loan for agricultural development OOF-like Loan Implementation 1200 
Zimbabwe 2004 ZESA Secures Funding for Lake Kariba Power Plant Vague (OF) Loan Pipeline: Commitment 1010 
Zambia 2010 Chinese firm to build Kafue Gorge power plant Vague (OF) Loan Implementation 930 
Sudan 2003 Loan for Hydro-Mechanic Components of the Merowe hydroelectric power station Vague (OF) Loan Completion 836 
Mauritius 2009 East-West Corridor, Ring Road, Bus Way, and Harbour Bridge Vague (OF) Loan Implementation 782 
Cameroon 2009 Loan for water distribution project Vague (OF) Loan Implementation 775 
Mozambique 2009 China builds Agricultural Research Center/Agriculture Station ODA-like In-kind Grant Completion 700 
Cameroon 2003 Memve'ele Dam Vague (OF) Loan Implementation 674 
Nigeria 2006 Light Rail Network Vague (OF) Loan Implementation 673 
Ethiopia 2006 Master Loan Program for Development Projects Phase I Vague (OF) Loan Implementation 673 
Egypt 2006 Cairo International Convention Center Loan Vague (OF) Loan Pipeline: Commitment 673 
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Appendix A-3. Chinese official finance over time by sector, 2000-2011 
Note: See Appendix B for list of aid sectors 
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Appendix A-4. Number of Chinese ODA projects by sector, 2000-2011 
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Appendix A-5. Monetary amount of Chinese ODA by sector, 2000-2011 
0
0
1
1
5
9
10
24
29
108
110
112
413
486
615
696
698
890
1025
1090
1620
2881
4085
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
Amount in millions of 2009 US$
Women in Development
Non-food commodity assistance
Business and Other Services
General Budget Support
Population / Reproductive Health
Support to NGOs and GOs
Industry, Mining, Construction
Developmental Food Aid
Banking and Financial Services
Education
Trade and Tourism
Emergency Response
Water Supply and Sanitation
Communications
Other Social infrastructure and services
Health
Other Multisector
Energy Generation and Supply
Government and Civil Society
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Unallocated / Unspecified
Transport and Storage
Action Relating to Debt
 
39	
	
Appendix A-6. Chinese official finance over time by recipient country, 2000-2011 
Note: See Appendix C for list of countries. AidData did not track any project in Burkina Faso, the Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Swaziland 
over the 2000-2011 period. 
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Appendix B. List of aid sectors 
Code Sector 
110 Education
120 Health 
130 Population policies/Programmes and reproductive health
140 Water supply and sanitation
150 Government and civil society
160 Other social infrastructure and services
210 Transport and storage
220 Communications
230 Energy generation and supply
240 Banking and financial services
250 Business and other services
310 Agriculture, forestry and fishing
320 Industry, mining and construction
330 Trade and tourism
410 General environmental protection
420 Women 
430 Other multisector
510 General budget support
520 Developmental food aid/Food security assistance
530 Non-food commodity assistance
600 Action relating to debt
700 Emergency response
920 Support to (non-)governmental organisations
998 Unallocated/Unspecified
110 Education
120 Health 
130 Population policies/Programmes and reproductive health
140 Water supply and sanitation
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Appendix C. List of countries 
 
Code Country Code Country
AGO Angola MDG Madagascar 
BDI Burundi MLI Mali 
BEN Benin MOZ Mozambique 
BFA Burkina Faso MRT Mauritania 
BWA Botswana MUS Mauritius 
CAF Central African Rep. MWI Malawi 
CIV Cote D'Ivoire MYT Mayotte 
CMR Cameroon NAM Namibia 
COD Congo, Dem. Rep. NER Niger 
COG Congo, Rep. NGA Nigeria 
COM Comoros RWA Rwanda 
CPV Cape Verde SDN Sudan 
DJI Djibouti SEN Senegal 
DZA Algeria SHN Saint Helena 
EGY Egypt SLE Sierra Leone 
ERI Eritrea SOM Somalia 
ETH Ethiopia SSD South Sudan 
GAB Gabon STP Sao Tome and Principe 
GHA Ghana SWZ Swaziland 
GIN Guinea SYC Seychelles 
GMB Gambia TCD Chad 
GNB Guinea-Bissau TGO Togo 
GNQ Equatorial Guinea TUN Tunisia 
KEN Kenya TZA Tanzania 
LBR Liberia UGA Uganda 
LBY Libya ZAF South Africa 
LSO Lesotho ZMB Zambia 
MAR Morocco ZWE Zimbabwe 
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APPENDIX D. Comparing TUFF with existing data sources. 
In order to preliminarily gauge the comprehensiveness of our data, we compared the records contained in 
AidData’s Chinese Official Finance to Africa Dataset, Version 1.0 with four existing data sources of 
Chinese official finance. First, to determine the extent to which our data match the (admittedly limited) 
data on Chinese aid from official sources, we cross-checked our project records with the project records 
reported in China’s MOFCOM Yearbooks from 2000-2005 (with the exception of 2002 when no data 
were reported). Matching our data to MOFCOM Yearbooks proved difficult, as the Yearbooks report 
project completion years while our database records project commitment years and then follows up on 
whether projects have been implemented and/or completed. That said, the results from the matching 
exercise suggest that our database contains more projects listed in MOFCOM Yearbooks for more recent 
years. This makes sense because commitment years for earlier projects have a higher probability of 
occurring before 2000—our data collection cut-off date. We matched 6% of MOFCOM projects 
completed in 2000, 27% in 2001, 50% in 2003, 62% in 2004, and 50% in 2005. 
 Second, we cross-checked our database with humanitarian aid data recorded in the Financial 
Tracking Service (FTS) of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). While our 
dataset contains 86 official finance projects coded as “Developmental Food Aid/Food Security 
Assistance” and “Emergency response” in the 2000-2011 period, FTS contains only 26 humanitarian 
assistance project records that would plausibly meet our database inclusion criteria. Of the 19 FTS records 
that contain sufficient information for our comparison, 13 (68%) can be matched to a specific project in 
our dataset. This suggests that we are collecting more comprehensive and detailed Chinese humanitarian 
assistance data than FTS. 
 Third, we have compared our dataset with the Food Aid Information System (FAIS), an online 
database provided by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) that tracks international food aid flows. 
Results were mixed. On one hand, we found that FAIS reported over 40 recipient-year pairings with food 
aid from China that did not exist in our database. But we also found 10 pairings in our dataset that were 
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not in the FAIS database. There were over 10 pairings that showed up in both databases. However, FAIS 
does not provide data for 2010 and also only reports Chinese food aid to 30 African states, excluding a 
substantial number of recipients for which AidData has food aid records. The AidData-FAIS matching 
results suggest that our methodology may not be as effective for collecting food aid data as it is for 
tracking Chinese foreign aid in other sectors. But FAIS also seems to suffer from substantial data gaps in 
reporting Chinese food aid to African countries. Taken together, these comparisons with MOFCOM 
Yearbooks, FTS and FAIS suggest that open source data are no substitute for official data but a viable 
second-best solution, particularly when official data are largely incomplete. 
 Fourth, we cross-checked a database of incoming aid flows managed by Malawi’s Ministry of 
Finance. Malawi’s Aid Management Platform contains data from 30 donor agencies and US$ 5.3 billion 
in commitments (current US$), representing approximately 80% of all external funding reported to the 
Ministry of Finance since 2000. Out of 2,584 projects in the AMP Malawi database, only two records 
(2008 and 2009 project) list the People’s Republic of China as the donor entity, totaling US$ 163 million 
(current US$). Both of these projects are included in our dataset. However, our dataset includes 14 
additional Chinese official finance projects in Malawi, totaling US$ 164.8 million in commitments. 
Collectively, these projects double the amount of recorded commitments of Chinese official finance in 
Malawi. This comparison illustrates the added value of using TUFF as another method to track aid flows 
in the absence of official project records. 
 In addition to comparisons with these four official databases, we compare the annual amount of 
total Chinese aid to Africa, as represented by our new dataset, and estimates from previous studies (see 
again Table 1). Our dataset contains 937 “ODA-like” project IDs with an aggregate value of US$ 13.0 
billion (in constant 2009 US$). The 937 figure includes projects identified as being in the “Commitment,” 
“Implementation,” or “Completion” stages, and excludes projects with a status of “Pledge.” This is an 
average of less than US$ 1.1 billion of Chinese ODA to Africa per annum during the twelve year study 
range. This is roughly comparable to previous studies such as Bräutigam (2011), Wang (2007) and The 
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Economist (2004) that estimated Chinese ODA to Africa to be somewhere between US$ 1 and US$ 2 
billion for a particular year in our study’s time range. More broadly, our database contains 1,422 projects 
that have been classified as “Chinese Official Finance,” which includes projects labeled as “ODA-like,” 
“OOF-like” and “Vague Official Finance,” for a total of US$ 75.4 billion between 2000-2011, or US$ 6.3 
billion per year. This estimate falls in between previous wide-ranging estimates such as the CRS/NYU 
Wagner School study that placed 2007 Chinese “aid and related activities” at US$ 18.0 billion (Lum et al. 
2009), and Christensen (2010), who estimated 2009 Chinese “aid” to Africa at US$ 2.1 billion. 
 AidData’s aggregate estimates must be considered in light of two important caveats. First, our 
estimates not only include data for completed Chinese aid projects, but also for projects in the 
commitment stage that have been announced or remain in the preparation/design phase but have not 
necessarily broken ground, as well as for projects for which implementation is underway but that have not 
been reported as completed. The total values for Chinese official finance are considerably smaller when 
we exclude projects that lack information that they have been finalized (US$ 19.4 billion over the 2000-
2011 period) or have at least been started (US$ 48.6 billion). Second, 38% of the official finance records 
in our database lack financial values. It therefore stands to reason that we may have under-estimated 
Chinese official development flows to Africa in this paper as a result. We hope to fill in as many of these 
missing financial values as possible in future updates to the dataset.29 To obtain more accurate estimations 
of the total monetary value of China’s development finance, future research should elaborate ways to 
impute missing monetary values of individual projects based on their observed characteristics. 
 
	
 
																																																								
29  To this end, we have created a web-based platform available online at china.aiddata.org to solicit better 
information about Chinese aid and investment projects and programs. 
